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Abstract
The recent claim that gain discount rates are higher than loss rates is reexamined
using the intertemporal choice paradigm developed in Loewenstein (1988).
Loewenstein's paradigm explains how different question frames (non-neutral frames)
can generate different implied discount rates. The apparent difference is not due to
outcome sign alone, however, but rather to the interaction between an outcome's sign
and proposed changes in its timing. This paper demonstrates how Loewenstein's
framework relates to two previous studies of discounting patterns (Thaler, 1981 ; and
Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989) and why the gain/loss discount rate differences
reported cannot be attributed solely to outcome sign. This study replicates Benzion et al.
(1989) but adds the two neutral scenarios not previously examined. Responses from 74
business students were used to estimate discount rates for six scenarios, four
receipt/payment amounts, and four outcome times. The results are consistent with those
of Thaler (1 981 ), Loewenstein (1 988), and Benzion et al. (1 989) for the scenarios they
examined. Because the neutral frame used to construct the two new scenarios should
not produce the reference point effect (i.e., the sense of gain or loss that results from
changing an outcome's timing once the original timing has been accepted), the
anticipated difference in receipt and payment discount rates should be small, and the
payment rate should be higher due to the discrepancy between the gain and loss
portions of the value function and the method chosen for estimating discount rates. This
was the result obtained.
KEYWORDS: Discount Rates, Decision Making, Framing, Intertemporal
Decisions, Time Preference
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1. Introduction
Because most nonroutine economic decisions affect the future welfare of the
decision maker, an effective decision process will explicitly address considerations such
as opportunity costs, rates of return, interest, the size and timing of cash flows, and
economic forecasts. Many formal decision models do. But not all businesses and few
individuals actually employ these models. Because many problems involve outcomes
that are not easily quantified and, hence, are not easily adapted to formal models, many
decision makers rely instead on their own time preferences and on intuitive assessments
of future values. Unlike the standard discounting model, subjective discount functions
do not always imply constant-rate discounting over time or across outcomes, and
inconsistent discounting can lead to inconsistent planning (Strotz, 1955).
For example:
• If discount rates are substantially higher for short delays than for longer
time frames, a decision maker may prefer option A from Set 1, but
option B from Set 2, below (Thaler, 1981):
Option A: One apple today. Option A: One apple in one year.
Option B: Two apples tomorrow. Option B: Two apples in one
year plus one day.
• If discount rates are not constant over time, a dieter may formulate an
optimal plan on Friday to begin dieting on Monday, and find that, once
Monday arrives, his plan is no longer optimal and must be changed.
• If a decision maker's utility values depend on outcome timing (in the
sense of a particular date, x) as well as on outcome kind and quantity (x)
and time distance (t), his implied discount function will not decrease
monotonically in t over all delay lengths:
A decision maker may have positive utility for both mineral water (x) and
champagne (x') and may generally prefer mineral water (u(x,t,T) = 10 >
u(x',t,x) = 5), except on New Year's Eve (x') when she prefers
champagne (u(x,t,x') = 10 < u(x',t,x') = 15). The discounted value of a
bottle of champagne three months hence, therefore, will depend on
whether the three-month period ends on New Year's Eve. The value of
a sum of discounted utilities for a glass of champagne each night over
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three months will depend on whether New Year's Eve is included in the
three month period.
• If consumers expect that their financial market borrowing rate will be
substantially higher than their lending rate, they may discount changes
in financial position at different rates, according to the direction of
change (postpone or expedite) (Loewenstein, 1988).
Clearly, some intertemporal inconsistencies can be predicted from particular discounting
patterns.
Because different discounting patterns lead to different choices, the ability to
predict choices depends both on the reliability of the patterns detected and on the care
with which experimental conditions are defined and results interpreted. Recent
laboratory studies have revealed several consistent discounting patterns. Stevenson's
(1986) work shows that decision makers tend to use a ratio discounting model, which is
consistent with the standard approach, but discount rate estimates from other studies
reveal rates that tend to vary inversely with both time distance and absolute outcome
magnitude, which is not consistent with the standard approach (Thaler, 1981 ; Benzion et
al., 1989). Thaler (1981) and, more recently, Benzion et al. (1989) have also detected
an apparent difference between receipt and payment discount rates. This last
observation is the subject of this study; the question addressed is whether the discount
rate discrepancy reported in Thaler and Benzion et al. is actually attributable to outcome
sign or to the interaction between outcome sign and question frame (i.e., to the scenario
used to describe the intertemporal choice).
In what follows, the applicability of Loewenstein's reference point model to
previous investigations of intertemporal choice is demonstrated and some previous
results are reinterpreted based on its predictions for the scenarios studied. Then,
predictions are made for the sizes of discount rates elicited using two neutral scenarios
relative to the discount rates elicited using the non-neutral scenarios from previous
studies. The second section presents background information, theory development and
hypotheses; section three describes the experiment used to test the hypotheses, section
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four presents results, and section five is a discussion of the results and directions for
future research.
2. Background, Theory Development and Hypotheses
2.1 Background
The standard approach to discounting and interest evolved from theories of
capital appearing as early as the eighteenth century. One early treatment of the subject
was written by Bohm-Bawerk (1923), a political philosopher and economist of the
Austrian School who argued that interest rates result (at least in part) from impatience, a
pervasive preference for present over future consumption, which, in turn, results from
insufficient imagination, weakness of will, and finite and uncertain human lifetimes. His
theory was later formalized by Fisher (1930) in what is now considered the conventional
discounted utility (DU) model. Although "[t]he phenomenon of impatience was
introduced by Bohm-Bawerk as a psychological characteristic of human economic
preference in decisions concerning (presumably) finite time horizons, [i]t now appears
that impatience ... is also a necessary logical consequence of more elementary
properties of a utility function of programs with an infinite time horizon" (Koopmans,
1960, p.306; see also Koopmans, Diamond, & Williamson, 1964: Diamond, 1965;
Koopmans, 1986).
In general, individual rates of time preference are independent of market interest
rates and discount functions may depend on outcome magnitudes and on outcome
timing (other than time distance). But such dependencies can lead to inconsistent and
suboptimal economic choices (Strotz, 1955). If an individual wishes to maximize the
utility of his lifetime consumption stream, he will adjust his rates of time preference to
market rates and choose a discount function that is independent of outcome magnitudes,
and of outcome timing except for time distance, so that discount rates will be constant
overtime and the direction of change in financial position. Strotz (1955) suggests that
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decision behavior exhibiting this sort of consistent discounting pattern is not natural, but
learned. Consumers should learn to act as if their discount rates are constant over time
and independent of outcome magnitude. Whether they do so consistently and
pervasively is an empirical issue.
2.2 Theory Development
2.2.1 Question Frames for Intertemporal Choice
In a study that relates framing issues to discounting patterns and intertemporal
choice, Loewenstein (1988) describes three question frames that can be used to elicit
information about subjects' relative preferences for consumption times. He states that:
1. One might ask subjects "to specify the most they would pay to obtain an
object immediately (the immediate consumption price) and then ask
how much they would pay to get the object following a time delay (the
delayed consumption price)," or (Neutral Frame)
2. one might ask how much subjects "would pay to obtain an object
immediately, instruct them to imagine that they have made the
purchase, and then ask for the smallest amount they would accept in
order to delay consuming," or (Delay Frame)
3. one might "ask how much they would pay to obtain the object following
a time delay, instruct them to imagine that they have paid that amount,
and them ask for the most they would be willing to pay to speed up
consumption so as to eliminate the delay" (Loewenstein, 1988, p. 202).
(Speed-up/Expedite Frame)
The critical difference between the neutral frame and the delay and speed-up
frames is that the two non-neutral frames induce subjects to adjust psychologically to
owning a good at a particular time."" Because subjects are asked to imagine possession,
their reference points shift, at least partially, to reflect the adjustment. Then, when
desirable consumption is delayed (frame 2), subjects sense a loss (i.e., they interpret the
delay of planned desirable consumption, or the delay of an anticipated increase in
wealth, as a loss). Similarly, they interpret speeding up planned desirable consumption
(
"•
If the outcomes were undesirable, subjects would adjust to a decrease in their welfare immediately
(frame 2) or at a particular time in the future (frame 3).
Outcome Signs, Question Frames, and Discount Rates 6
as a gain. There is a three-step process associated with frame 2 (frame 3) that consists
of: (1) determining an immediate (future) consumption value (For monetary outcomes,
the immediate value is given.), (2) adjusting psychologically to immediate (future)
possession or consumption, and (3) assessing the loss (gain) that results from
postponing (speeding up) consumption to arrive at a suitable premium (cost). The three
steps are depicted in Figures 1 , 2, and 3 (respectively) below for frame 2 used with
desirable consumption. Figure 1 corresponds to Figure 1 in Loewenstein (1988, p. 205)
which shows the gain experienced from contemplating consumption of the item. The
original reference point, r, is typically taken to be zero.
v(x)' i
v(x')
'X
-X
N^o purchase (r)
/^ v(-x) , f
Figure 1
Figure 2 shows the reference point shift that results from adapting (at least
partially) to possession of the good (x') at a particular time. The reference point shifts
from r = to r* = x'.2
2|t is not necessary for the model's predictions that decision makers adapt completely; that is, it is not
essential that r* = x'.
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Figure 3 was adapted from Figure 2 in Loewenstein (1988, p. 205). It shows the
loss that would be experienced if desirable consumption to which the consumer has
adapted were delayed. It also shows the way a consumer might arrive at the premium
that just compensates his loss (g - 3(t)| r-x'|, for monetary outcomes, where 3(t) is a
discount function that depends on t, but not on x).3 Because value functions typically are
steeper for loss than gain, g > | r - x'| .
^Loewenstein's expression for the delay premium is given in terms of subjective value (i.e., values of
the function v(x)). It is -[1-5(t)]v(-x'), where 5(t) is some discount function that is decreasing in t (time)
(Loewenstein, 1988). A little effort shows that the objective value of the delay premium is g - B(t)|r - x'| = g -
R(t)|-x'| (>0), where B(t) is a discount function possibly different from 5(t) if v() is nonlinear.
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Loewenstein's purpose was to show that question frames 2 and 3 can produce a
sense of loss or gain that generates an (apparent) increase in subjective discount rates.
He predicted that (1) the three nnethods would not generate the same implied discount
rates, (2) implied discount rates for both delayed and expedited desirable consumption
would be higher than the implied discount rate for the neutral situation, and (3) the
implied rate for delayed desirable consumption would be higher than the implied rate for
expedited planned consumption. All three hypotheses were supported in his sequence
of experiments. The three frames do not produce identical implied discount rates and
the differences are related to the different psychological reference points induced by the
three frames.
The amounts that subjects were willing to pay to speed up desirable consumption
and the amounts they demanded to compensate delayed desirable consumption both
exceeded the difference between the dollar value of consumption now and the dollar
value of consumption later (frame 1). The implied discount rate for delayed consumption
(a subjective loss) was greater than the implied discount rate for expedited consumption
(a subjective gain). Because only desirable consumption (e.g., a gift certificate) was
addressed in his study, Loewenstein made no predictions concerning the relative sizes
of discount rates for desirable vs. undesirable consumption (e.g., receipts vs. payments).
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He hypothesized that the rates inferred from subject responses elicited using the
two non-neutral frames will consist of (at least) two components - one atthbutable to time
preference and one to the reference point shift. "Accurate estimation of discount rates
thus [will require] parsing out the relative impact of [time] discounting per se and of
reference point shifts" (Loewenstein, 1988, p. 211). Loewenstein also speculated that,
once the effect of the reference point shift was removed, discount rates might not "vary
according to type of consequence and delay versus speed up" (Loewenstein, 1988, p.
211).
2.2.2 Result Comparisons
Although Loewenstein used only desirable consumption items in his tests, his
theory suggests that the delay of planned undesirable consumption will be experienced
as a gain. Similarly, it seems reasonable to predict that speeding up expected
undesirable consumption will induce a sense of loss. Six scenarios can be constructed
by fully crossing frame (neutral, delay, and speed-up) and outcome sign (receipt or
payment). Loewenstein's theory, with this extension, implies that the four non-neutral
scenarios have two possible interpretations, subjective loss (for delayed receipts or
expedited payments) or subjective gain (for delayed payments or expedited receipts).
The gain/loss interpretation depends on the interaction between outcome sign and any
proposed change in outcome timing, not merely on whether the scenario involves a
receipt or payment outcome. Loewenstein included three of the six possible scenarios
in his tests; they are identified in Figure 4.
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Receipt
(Desirable)
Outcome
Sign
Payment
(Undesirable)
Delay
Frame
Neutral Expedite
Included
96.0%
Subjective Loss
Included
24.0%
None
Included
31 .0%
Subjective Gain
Subjective Gain None Subjective Loss
Loewenstein (1988)
Figure 4
Loewenstein's (1988) results show that:
1. Delaying desirable consumption produces a subjective loss condition,
2. expediting desirable consumption produces a subjective gain condition,
and
3. manipulating subjects* reference points to produce loss and gain
conditions results in higher implied discount rates than would be
reflected by time preferences alone (the neutral frame).
The mean implied annual discount rates that resulted from Loewenstein's first
experiment were 96 percent for delayed desirable consumption (receipt/delay, a
subjective loss) and 31 percent for expedited desirable consumption (receipt/expedite, a
subjective gain), but the mean implied annual discount rate for the neutral condition
(frame 1) was only 24 percent.
In an earlier study of discounting patterns, Thaler (1981) tested the following three
hypotheses: (1 ) discount rates vary inversely with the length of time to be waited, (2)
discount rates vary inversely with the absolute magnitude of the outcome, and (3) loss
and gain discount rates are different. All three hypotheses appeared to hold. Thaler
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included both receipt and payment (desirable and undesirable) outcomes, but employed
only one question frame (delay) to elicit implied discount rates (i.e., he used frame 2 for
both outcome signs). For example, "subjects were told that they had won some money
in a lottery held by their bank. They could take the money now or wait until later. They
were asked how much they would require to make waiting [three months, one year, or
three years] just as attractive as getting the money now" (Thaler, 1981
,
p. 203). Thaler
also asked subjects to imagine they owed a fine (a traffic ticket) and then asked them
how much they would be willing to pay in three months, one year, or three years, so that
they would be just indifferent between paying the fine immediately or after the delay.-*
From Loewenstein (1988) we now know that Thaler used a question frame that
would shift subjects' reference points. He created subjective loss scenarios for receipts
(positive outcomes) and subjective gain scenarios for payments (negative outcomes).
As shown in Figure 5, Thaler included two of six possible scenarios in his experiment.^
Frame
Delay Expedite
Receipt
(Desirable)
Outcome
Sign
Payment
(Undesirable)
Included
101.5%
Subjective Loss Subjective Gain
Included
15.2%
Subjective Gain Subjective Loss
Thaler (1981)
Figure 5
^ Anrx)unts between $15 and $3,000 were stated in the question, so the immediate positive
outcome value was given. Loss amounts were between $15 and $250.
^The rates shown in Figure 5 are averaged over receipt or payment magnitudes using only those
absolute magnitudes that the two outcome signs had in common .
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Thaler noted that delayed receipts generate higher implied discount rates than
delayed payments and, because he defined a gain as a receipt and a loss as a payment,
he concluded that "implicit discount rates [are] higher for gains". He did not consider
perceived changes in financial position. He meant that outcome sign (receipt or
payment) influences discount rates and positive outcomes generate a higher implied
discount rates than negative outcomes.
Because the data were gathered using one of the two non-neutral frames, more
than time preference for receipts and payments is reflected in the difference between the
immediate (given) amounts of the prizes/fines and the (subjective) future amounts. Thus,
any conclusions about the relative sizes of discount rates for receipts vs. payments are
questionable. The delayed receipt is a subjective loss scenario; the delayed fine is a
subjective gain scenario; and both interpretations result from reference point shifts.
Loewenstein's results show discount rates are not the same when there is a reference
point manipulation as when there is none, that subjective loss scenarios produce higher
implied rates than subjective gain scenarios, and that the estimated implied rate consists
of both a time discount rate and a rate that represents compensation for the subjective
loss or gain. Using Thaler's results alone, it is impossible to determine whether the
higher implied discount rates for receipts were generated by the positive outcome sign
or by the subjective loss scenario (i.e., the interaction between outcome sign and frame).
But when they are combined with the results from Loewenstein (1988), it seems
reasonable to conclude that the discount rate difference is associated with the subjective
loss/gain scenarios.
In a more recent study, Benzion et al. (1989) recognized the importance of both
direction of change (frame) and outcome sign, so each outcome magnitude and delay
length in their experiment was presented within four scenarios, consisting of delayed
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receipts and payments and expedited receipts and payments.^ Their delay/receipt
condition produced the following scenario:
"Scenario A (postpone a receipt) concerns a case of a person who has just
earned $y for his or her work in a financially solid public institute. Upon
coming to receive the payment, the person is told that the institute is
temporarily short of funds. Instead, he or she is assured payment of
another amount of $x, t time periods from now" (Benzion et a!., 1989, p.
275). Subjects were asked to provide the amount $x.
All four scenarios suggest changes in current financial position which Benzion et
al. (1989) labeled liquidity increases and decreases. Benzion et al.'s liquidity decreases
correspond to subjective losses, and liquidity increases to subjective gains associated
with the delay and speed-up frames in Loewenstein (1988). Benzion et al. (1989)
included one combination (expedite/payment) not found in either Loewenstein (1988) or
Thaler (1981) (Figure 6).
Frame
Delay Expedite
Receipt
1 (Desirable)
Outcome
Sign
Payment
(Undesirable)
Included
Subjective Loss
(Uquidity Decrease)
Included
Subjective Gain
(Liquidity Increase)
Included
Subjective Gain
(Liquidity Increase)
Included
Subjective Loss
(Liquidity Decrease)
B enzlon et al. (1989)
Figure 6
^Like Thaler (1981) Benzion et al. (1989) found that discount rates vary inversely with tjoth delay
length and absolute outcome magnitude.
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The purpose of the Benzion et al (1989) experiment was to test "four hypotheses
regarding the behavior of discount rates" (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 270)7 Two of the
hypotheses were consistent with Loewenstein's prediction that discount rates differ
according to the direction of reference point shifts. The implied discount rates estimated
for each scenario using the formula F = P(1+ r)^ are shown in Figure 7.8
Frame
Delay Expedite
Receipt
(Desirable)
Outcome
Sign
Payment
(Undesirable)
Included Included
27% 17.6%
Subjective Loss Subjective Gain
Included Included
16.7% 24.1%
Subjective Gain Subjective Loss
Benzion et al. (1989)
Figure 7
Benzion et al. (1989) conclude from these estimates that "discount rates ... are
smaller for losses than for gains" (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 282). The previously
uninvestigated combination, expedite/payment (a subjective loss), produced a discount
rate that, like the delay/receipt combination (also a subjective loss), is substantially
larger than either of the rates produced by the two subjective gain scenarios. It is fairly
^The hypotheses tested were the classical (standard) approach, a market segmentation approach,
the one-period implicit risk (OPR) approach and an added compensation (AC) approach. Their results
support txDth "an implicit risk hypothesis . . . and an added compensation hypothesis (Benzion et al., 1989,
p. 270). The implicit risk hypothesis asserts that individuals will demand (pay) a premium to compensate the
added uncertainty associated with future receipts (payments). The added compensation hypothesis
"asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position" (Benzion et al., 1989,
p.270). A multi-period risk approach was also examined but was not supported.
^These are the means, across Sum and Time, of the rates shown in Benzion et al (1989)., Table 1
,
page 276.
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clear from these three studies that subjective loss scenarios (liquidity decreases) induce
higher rates than subjective gain scenarios (liquidity increases), regardless of outcome
sign. Both subjective loss scenarios can be considered borrowing situations; the
subjective gain scenarios are lending situations. The observed rate discrepancies may
imply anticipated differences in subjects' market borrowing and lending rates.
It is also clear that the discount rates associated with receipts are not consistently
higher than those associated with payments. Within liquidity conditions implied discount
rates are higher for receipts. Within direction of change, the receipt rate is higher for the
delay frame, but lower for the expedite frame.
Thaler (1981) argues that we should expect higher gain than loss rates because
people tend to underweight opportunity costs relative to out-of-pocket costs. But if
subjects have completely adjusted to owning a lottery prize, its delay may be viewed as
an out-of-pocket cost. The high discount rate associated with this out-of-pocket cost
reflects a strong dislike for out-of-pocket costs and a commensurate premium demand.
Similarly, if subjects have fully adjusted to paying a fine, delaying the payment may be
viewed as an opportunity to invest the payment amount for the delay period. The future
value is the opportunity cost of failing to delay.
2.2.3 Hypotheses
The studies reviewed above do not provide the evidence necessary to make
reliable inferences about the relative magnitudes of receipt and payment (time) discount
rates, despite the conclusions stated in Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989).
Loewenstein suggests that the delay and expedite frames produce implied discount
rates that consist of two components, one associated with time discounting and one with
the reference point shift; whereas, the neutral frame produces rates associated only with
time discounting. The neutral frame does not induce a sense of gain or loss because no
change in outcome timing is proposed. To help determine whether or not a difference
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exists between receipt and payment discount rates and the direction of the difference, if
any, an experiment like the one conducted by Benzion et al. (1989) was earned out , but
with a neutral scenario added for each outcome sign.
Loewenstein's theory predicts no difference between implied gain and loss
(receipt and payment) rates when there is no proposed change in outcome timing to
induce it. The apparent rate difference induced in the non-neutral frames is due to the
difference in the slopes of the gain and loss portions of the value function (Loewenstein,
1988). An outcome sign/frame combination that suggests a subjective loss is evaluated
on the negative, steeper, portion of the value function, resulting in a larger implied
discount rate than one evaluated on the gain portion.
The first three hypotheses tested are taken directly from Loewenstein (1988) and
follow from his reference point model for intertemporal choice: (HI) Delayed receipt
scenarios generate higher implied discount rates than expedited receipt scenarios, (H2)
delayed receipt scenarios generate higher implied discount rates than neutral receipt
scenarios
,
and (H3) expedited receipt scenarios generate higher implied discount rates
than neutral receipt scenarios.
The next three hypotheses are merely the negative-outcome counterparts of those
stated above. Loewenstein's reference point model is easily extended to predict the
effect of the three frames on implied discount rates for undesirable consumption
(payments): (H4) Implied discount rates for delayed payment scenarios will be lower
than implied discount rates for expedited payment scenarios, (H5) implied discount rates
for neutral payment scenarios will be higher than implied rates for delayed payment
scenarios, and (H6) implied discount rates generated in expedited payment scenarios
will be higher than those generated in the neutral payment scenarios.
The model also allows predictions of the relative sizes of discount rates within
frames but across outcome signs: (H7) Delayed receipt scenarios generate higher
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implied discount rates than delayed payment scenarios, and (H8) expedited payment
scenarios generate higher implied discount rates than expedited receipt scenarios.
Comparisons of neutral frame rates with expedited frame rates are more difficult to
predict because the size of any difference detected will depend on the extent to which
subjects adjust to future receipts or payments. It is clear that differences will be smaller
than differences between the neutral and delay frames because the psychological
adjustment (the reference point shift) associated with the speed-up frame is smaller than
the shift that results from first adjusting to an immediate receipt or payment. This is
because subjects are adjusting to consumption, payments, or receipts that will take
place in the future, rather than immediately. One might speculate that the size of the
reference point shift, and hence the size of the implied rate, will depend on the time
distance of the anticipated outcome.
Letting FV(x) represent the future value of a current dollar amount, x, the formula
used to compute implied discount rates is FV(x) = x(1 + r)^ Clearly, this discounting
model assumes that v(x) = x, for all x. But the predictions of Loewenstein's intertemporal
choice model are based on the assumption that decision makers have subjective value
functions that are steeper for losses than gains. When comparisons of subjective values
are made across scenarios, using the formula above, all the difference in subjective
value is captured in the computed implied discount rate, so the estimated rate captures
both time discounting and the change in value attributable to the frame (the reference
point shift). For example, letting 6(t) represent the discount function, t the length of time
to the outcome, v() a subject's value function, and r and r' a subject's discount rates for
two different scenarios, the delay premium for receipts and delay cost for payments are:^
-[1 - 6(t)]v(-x) (> 0), and (1)
-[1 - 6(t)]v(x) (< 0). respectively. (2)
^The value function v() is assumed to be linear and to have a steeper slope for negative than for
positive values of x; the values of v associated with negative values of x are negative; those associated with
positive values of x are positive.
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The model assumes the same discount factor, 5(t), across outcome signs. Letting 5(t) =
(1 + r)-^ and assuming r = r', it is clear that
-[1-(1+r)-t]v(-x)>[1-(1+r')-t]v(x)
because -v(-x) > v(x) when the negative portion of the value function is steeper. But if the
value function assumed is v(-x) = -x and v(x) = x, for rate computation purposes, when
the true value function has -v(-x) > v(x), then
-[1-(1+r)-t](-x)>[1-(1+r')-t]x
will result in estimated rates r and r' such that r < r'. The estimated discount rates r and r'
capture both time discounting and the effect of differing gain and loss slopes. If both
outcome signs are (time) discounted at the same rate and have the same slope, then r =
r'.
If on average subjects exhibit the sort of value functions Loewenstein's theory
assumes, then, unless some procedure is used to assess or estimate the values v(x), a
rate discrepancy across subjective loss and gain scenarios should always appear and
(H9) subjective loss scenarios (delayed receipts and expedited payments) should
always generate higher implied rates than subjective gain scenarios (delayed payments
and expedited receipts), (H10) neutral scenarios will also produce a rate discrepancy
across receipts and payments, the payment rate should be higher, and (H11) the
difference should be smaller than the difference between subjective gain and loss rates
for the delay frames, but equal to or greater than the difference between the subjective
gain and loss rates for the expedite frame. The greater the adjustment (up to x), the
smaller the difference.
3. Experiment
3.1 Subjects
The responses of 74 subjects enrolled in upper level undergraduate or masters
level accounting courses were used to test the hypotheses above. All subjects had
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completed at least one course that included formal instruction in discounting. Response
booklets of 14 of the 88 subjects who started the task contained one or more missing
values or responses indicating the subjects did not understand the task. Those subjects I
were dropped.
3.2 Design
The design included four within-subject factors, outcome sign (two levels), frame
(three levels - delay, neutral, and expedite), time (four levels - six months, one year, two
years, and four years), and amount (four levels - $40, $200, $1000, and $5000).
Crossing sign with frame creates the six scenarios investigated. Four of these (delayed
receipts (A), delayed payments (B), expedited receipts (C), and expedited payments (D))
were investigated by Benzion et al. (1989). Two scenarios, neutral receipts (E), and
neutral payments (F) have been added. A significant sign by frame interaction implies a
significant scenario effect. Subjects were asked to respond to 96 (2x3x4x4)
experimental questions. The levels of the time and amount factors match those selected
by Benzion et al. Scenarios A, B, C, and D were presented as shown in Benzion et al.
An example of the neutral frame is shown below (Figure 8). The primary difference
between the two neutral frames and those that are expected to induce a reference point
effect is that there is no proposed change in outcome timing. Hence, no sense of loss or
gain due to a change in outcome timing is generated in these two scenarios.
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You owe a debt of $40 in four years to a public institute. What is the (negative) value,
-$x,.of that debt to you now? Please indicate -$x on the scale below.
-$80 $0 $80
-$40 $40
Figure 8
3.3 Task
Subjects were presented the 96 experimental questions in 8 1/2 inch by 1 1 inch
spiral-bound booklets. Subjects were asked to respond to the experimental questions
on a scale with endpoints adjusted for the amount considered in each individual
question. Several subjects preferred to state dollar amounts and were allowed to do so.
The task took approximately 45 minutes to complete.
3.4 Analysis
Scale measurements were converted to dollar amounts and the dollar amounts
were used to compute the implied discount rates used in the ANOVA and the cell mean
comparisons discussed below.
4. Results
As indicated in Table 1, neither outcome sign nor frame alone is significant at
conventional levels, although sign is close at p = .0632.''
o
^^he confidence level selected for ANOVA effects was a = .05, for cell mean comparisons it was a
= .10. In both cases probability values were computed using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon.
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Source df SS MS F P*
Outcome Sign 1 .432 .432 3.560 .0632
Frame 2 .429 .214 .907 .3970
Time 3 21.202 7.067 39.149 .0001
Amount 3 2.362 .787 9.403 .0011
Sign X Frame 2 5.375 2.688 15.259 .0001
Sign X Time 3 .906 .302 5.696 .0056
Frame x Time 6 1.704 .284 3.769 .0109
Sign x Amount 3 .169 .056 1.645 .1969
Frame x Amount 6 2.053 .342 3.785 .0338
Time x Amount 9 .778 .086 1.831 .1289
'The probability values shown were computed using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon
Table 1
The sign x frame interaction is highly significant, however, indicating a strong
effect for scenarios A through F. Figure 9, a plot of the sign by frame interaction, shows
why.
Interaction Plot
Effect: Sign * Frame
Dependent: Implied Rates
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The mean (across frames) discount rate for receipts is 17.2 percent; the mean
discount rate for payments is 15.6 percent. Sign is close to significance primarily
because of the very low rate generated by the delay/payment condition. Ignoring this
condition, the mean payment rate is 18.1 percent, nearly the same and the mean receipt
rate. Discount rates are significantly different for particular combinations of outcome sign
and frame; payment rates are larger in the expedite frame and smaller in the delay
frame.
The direction of discount rate differences for scenarios A through D are essentially
the same for this study as those produced in Benzion et al (See Figures 7 and 10). The
largest rate was produced by scenario A, delayed receipts; the second largest by
scenaho D, expedited payments. These two discount rates are not significantly different
(p = .244). Both scenarios depict potential borrowing situations. The lowest rates were
produced by scenarios B (delayed payments) and C (expedited receipts), and they are
significantly different (p = .023). Both represent potential lending situations. As Benzion
et al. suggest, the differences in implied rates associated with the direction of change in
liquidity may be due to anticipated differences in borrowing and lending rates.
As expected, all other rates fall between those from scenarios A and B. The
delayed receipt rate is significantly greater than both the expedited and neutral receipt
rates (p = .009, HI, and p = .054, H2). The prediction of a smaller neutral than expedited
receipt rate did not hold (p = .361 , H3). Expediting a payment that subjects expect to pay
in the future generates an implied rate nearly as great as the delayed receipt rate (p =
.244); and one that is significantly greater than delayed payments (p < .001 , H4). The
neutral and expedited payment rates are the same (p = .958, H6), but significantly
greater than the delayed payment rate (p < .001 , H5). The expedited payment rate is
also significantly greater than the expedited receipt rate (p = .091, H8), but within the
delay frame, receipts generated a higher discount rate (p < .001 , H7). As predicted, the
neutral payment rate is nominally larger than the neutral receipt rate, but the difference is
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not statistically significant (p = .327, H10); whereas, both of the other within-frame,
between-sign differences were significant (p < .001, within delay and p = .091, within
expedite, H11), and both are at least nominally larger than the neutral difference.
Delay
Frame
Neutral Expedite
Receipt
(Desirable)
Outcome
Sign
Payment
(Undesirable)
Included Included Included
20.0% 16.5% 15.0%
Subjective Loss None Subjective Gain
Included Included Included
10.7% 18.1% 18.1%
Subjective Gain None Subjective Loss
Figure 9
There is no systematic tendency for receipts to be discounted at higher rates than
payments. The threat of a liquidity decrease (a potential borrowing situation) has
consistently generated higher implied subjective discount rates than a liquidity increase
(potential lending situation) whether a receipt or payment was involved (p < .001, H9).
When no change in current liquidity is suggested, receipt and payment discount rates
appear to be about the same (H10).
There is no significant difference between the mean discount rates associated
with the two subjective loss scenarios (delay/receipt and expedite/payment); the two
subjective gain scenarios (delay/payment and expedite/receipt) are significantly
different. The delay/payment scenario generates exceptionally low rates. Stated
another way, the significant difference between the implied rates associated with
delayed receipts and those associated with delayed payments is attributable more to the
exceptionally low rates in the delay/payment condition than to any exceptionally high
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rates induced by the delay/receipt condition. The mean (across time and amount)
discount rate associated with scenario B is significantly smaller than every other mean
rate. This issue is discussed further below.
5. Discussion
Some very reliable patterns have been uncovered by recent investigations of
discounting. Evidence consistently reveals a tendency for subjective discount rates to
decrease both with the length of delay and with the absolute magnitude of the outcome
and this pattern was evident in the present study as well. A consistent pattern is also
emerging with respect to liquidity increases and decreases. People do not like to delay
receipts and will charge a hefty premium if they are asked to do so. The implication is
that liquidity decreases are discounted at higher rates than liquidity increases, but the
implied rate differences are attributable more to the shape of the value function
combined with a reference point shift than to any inherent tendency to discount the utility
(or subjective value) of outcomes at different rates.
On average, implied receipt discount rates appear larger than payment rates, but
when the frame of the intertemporal choice question is considered, a different picture
emerges. In the current study, most of the implied difference is attributable to the
extremely low rates found for the delayed payment experimental condition. This cell
indicates that, consistent with several early intertemporal choice studies, once subjects
have adjusted psychologically to experiencing a loss at a particular point in time, they
are not eager, and may even be averse, to delaying the loss (Loewenstein, 1987;
Mischel, Grusec & Masters, 1969). They are much less eager to delay a payment that to
expedite a receipt. In contrast, both Benzion et al. (1989) and the current study
produced results that imply subjects are about as reluctant to expedite a future payment
as they are to delay a current receipt, so the claim that people prefer to experience sure
losses sooner rather than later does not to hold in all circumstances. Rather, their
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preference appears to be related to whether they have previously adjusted to a
particular outcome date. When no change in outcome timing is proposed, there is no
apparent tendency for implied discount rates to be different. Alternatively, when no
change in outcome timing is proposed, borrowing and lending situations do not arise.
Loewenstein's reference point model predicted a lower rate for the neutral frame
than for the speed-up (expedite) frame for desirable consumption (receipts). No
difference was detected in this study, nor did the anticipated difference between
expedited and neutral payments appear. The expedited payment frame was expected to
generate lower rates than the neutral payment frame. Subjects may not have detected a
psychological difference between the neutral frame, as it was presented in this study,
and the expedite frame, but this explanation is unlikely because the receipt-payment rate
difference within the expedite frame is significant and the difference within the neutral
frame is not. Perhaps a superior method for estimating implied discount rates would
clarify the message concerning the neutral frame. For example, if subjective values
were reliably estimated along with discount factors, the discount rate inferred from the
factor estimate would no longer contain a component attributable to the gain/loss slope
difference. Only time preference would be reflected in implied rates. Spline functions
could be useful in such an estimation process.
The result that is not readily explained by the difference in the slope of the positive
and negative portions of the value function (coupled with a reference point shift) is the
significant difference between the delayed-payment and expedited-receipt rates. This
difference may be attributable to dread (Loewenstein, 1987). Just as people derive
positive utility from anticipating desirable consumption, they also derive negative utility
from dread of negative outcomes, but the effect of dread is hypothesized to be greater
than that of anticipation. In fact, the aversiveness of dread can generate negative
discount rates for some kinds of outcomes (e.g., Mischel et al., 1969). The disutility of
dread accumulates over time, so the length of the delay is important. This hypothesis
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implies a larger difference between the delay premiums for receipts and payments than
between the speed-up costs for receipts and payments because the effects of both
anticipation and dread are reduced in the speed-up (expedite) frame. This is consistent
with the results obtained in the current study. Alternatively, the difference may merely
reflect a more tenuous adaptation to future than to current outcomes; there is also weak
support for this hypothesis across subjective loss scenarios.
Also, six months is a relatively short period of time for most adults. A few
subjects mentioned that when a small payment was involved, a short delay was more of
an irritation than a blessing. For example. Subject 5 stated that, "The $40 payment was
just an annoyance; putting it off for six months or more was a further annoyance. The
$5,000 payment was not a mere annoyance, however, and delaying a $5,000 payment
was not an annoyance. I wasn't sure about the $200 payment, but the $1 ,000 payment
was like the $5,000 payment." If the sentiment expressed in this statement is a common
one, then relatively low, or negative, discount rates might be expected for the
delay/payment scenario (B), at least for small amounts and/or short delays.
This paper demonstrated the predictability of relative implied discount rates when
the decision maker's reference point is manipulated in certain ways. The results also
give some sense of the effect that imagining and adapting to an outcome (e.g., owning a
new car, settling a labor or legal dispute, completing a plant expansion) can have on
intertemporal decisions and on the planning process in general. To the extent that
decision makers' reference points are manipulatable by, for example, salesmen,
adversaries, managers, or labor leaders, the effect of creating one particular decision
frame rather than another is predictable. For example, the results of this study imply that
it is in a car salesman's interest to pursuade consumers to imagine they own a car on his
lot, right now. Once a decision maker has adapted to ownership, it will be difficult to walk
away without purchasing and wait for another time. Similarly, the U. S. Treasury benefits
from taxpayer's relative disinterest in deferring payment of their income taxes once they
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have adapted to paying the tax early (via withholding). Further attention should be
devoted to exploring the effectiveness of reference point manipulations in particular
contexts.
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